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Minority Rights Issues in Post-Apartheid
South Africa
H.A. STRYDOM*
I. INTRODUCIriON
On drawing parallels between Canada's and South Africa's
political and constitutional developments, a Canadian scholar re-
marked in 1993 that both countries were "in the midst of deep cri-
ses because of "their failure to satisfactorily reconcile nineteenth
century liberal nationalism with sharply conflicting ethnic and ra-
cial diversities."' In April 1994, South Africa held landmark post-
apartheid democratic elections, and a new constitutional dispensa-
tion of distinct liberal design 2 became the blueprint for a liberated
and democratic society in South Africa. This new constitutional
dispensation was embodied in two negotiated documents: the In-
terim Constitution of 19933 and a new or final constitution a
democratically elected Constitutional Assembly adopted in 1996.4
Both documents envisage a society based on the recognition
of human rights, democracy, and peaceful co-existence. They pur-
sue the creation of national unity among a diversity of origins, cul-
tures, languages, and persuasions. In the pursuit of these ideals,
however, the pitfalls are many and the potential for failure is con-
siderable. Hence, one may be skeptical about a solution that
* B Juris, LL.B., LL.M. University of the Free State; LL.D. University of South
Africa. Professor in Public International Law, University of the Free State.
1. B.D. Tennyson, The Failure of Liberal Nationalism: The Constitutional Evolution
of Canada and South Africa, 2 J. FOR CONTEMP. HIST. 1 (1993).
2. See Heribert Adam, Ethnic Versus Civic Nationalism: South Africa's Non-
Racialism in Comparative Perspective, 7 S. AFR. Soc. REV. 15, 23 (1994) ("For the time
being, South Africans have responded with a temporary liberal constitution, but mainly
rely on an inter-dependent economy and an interspersed population to keep a tenuous
divided state from fragmenting. The South African nation has yet to be born.").
3. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993).
4. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996).
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glosses over diverse identities and aspirations. Whether this accu-
sation fits the new legal and constitutional order in South Africa is
perhaps not self-evident. Some may even question its soundness
and argue that the new legal order adequately provides for the as-
pirations and needs- of minority groups. Not to be dismissed,
though, are the varied reactions against the present dispensation
and especially against the manner in which it is implemented. To
belittle the reaction as an inability to accept the fundamental
changes in society or as an attempt to secure past privileges is not
only misplaced in many instances, but may also be a deliberate dis-
regard for the interests and aspirations of certain sections of soci-
ety.
This Article examines the disposition of South Africa's cur-
rent legal order toward the protection of minorities. It focuses on
three general themes: past and present ideological positions and
their alienating effects; the scheme of minority protection under
the Interim and new Constitutions; and future options.
II. THE POLITICS OF ASSIMILATION AND EXCLUSION
In a recent article, Professor Thomas Franck correctly as-
cribed the bloody conflicts of our time and the private struggles for
identity to the confluence in political ideology of two concepts:
nation and state.5 In South Africa's political discourse, the confu-
sion between nation and state played a fundamental role in the
design of past policies, and post-apartheid doctrines on different
sides of the political spectrum often suffer from the same malady.
The alienating effect of these doctrines gives rise to much of the
anxiety about the protection of certain communities, which is fur-
ther complicated because South African perspectives and positions
on minority rights are deeply immersed in and dictated by strategic
concerns with political competition and conflict. At this juncture,
ascriptive identities and partisan loyalties in the distribution of
public goods still characterize South Africa and are constant
sources of doubt in the ability of the constitutional order to admin-
ister even-handed justice.
5. See Thomas Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in
Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 360 (1996).
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A. Logic of Ethno-nationalism
The dominant perspective that the boundaries of a cultural
community and the state must coincide defined both the black
homeland policy of the apartheid government and the idea of a
white homeland, once prevalent among white reactionary move-
ments.6 This identification of state and cultural community had
two notorious consequences. First, it had a colonizing effect on
society: all societal institutions, whether economic, educational,
legal, political, or social, had to display the characteristics, inter-
ests, and desires of the communal and national will. Second, cul-
tural groups were perceived as political groups. Consequently, the
state as the political form and organization of an ethno-national
community had to assume the function of the political precondi-
tion for cultural survival. The cultural community was then free to
make the instruments of state power subservient to its needs and
aspirations, which the colossal social' engineering experiment un-
der apartheid graphically demonstrated. Apartheid attempted to
culturally and ethnically "cleanse" South Africa by creating sepa-
rate homelands for ethnically diverse black population groups and
by designing an alternative legal system for blacks who could not
be persuaded to leave white South Africa and settle in their re-
spective culturally and ethnically "pure" homelands.
The legacy of this thinking still exists in a variety of contexts
and also arises in the minority rights debate. After the inaugura-
tiofi of members of the Volkstaat Council under the Interim Con-
stitution, 7 for example, a spokesperson for the Council com-
mented:
The Volkstaat must be a cultural home for the Afrikaner, in the
6. Currently, it is difficult to say how strong this idea still is. While some have not
discarded the idea altogether, other forms of autonomous rule may appeal to a wide spec-
trum of conservatives.
7. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 184(A). The inclusion of this section in
the Interim Constitution is the result of an agreement between right wing organizations
and others participating in the negotiations for an interim constitution. The purpose is to
provide some mechanism for the implementation of self-determination. The Council con-
sults the government on the available self-determination options, and acts in an advisory
capacity only.
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same way as Israel is the home for the Jews. It must be a place
where our children and grandchildren can maintain their politi-
cal self-determination to ensure the survival of the Afrikaner
nation as a cultural group.
8
This thinking usually translates cultural differences into politi-
cal differences, thus refuting the idea that the state is the custodian
of all cultural groups. Moreover, such an equation between cul-
tural and political self-determination raises a question concerning
the viability of fundamental rights protection. Because the state is
regarded as the embodiment of a single cultural community, other
cultures and their rights either must be excluded from the state's
custodianship or must constantly be put at risk by the state-
assuming culture.
Another example concerns the way that a certain class or cul-
ture, or certain ethnic or racial group can represent a guardian
class with a distinct calling and competence to preserve and defend
certain values and standards. Such representation may lead to the
privileging of a specific culture and of the institutions that suppos-
edly represent that culture if the group gains special forms of pro-
tection and eventually some form of political control.9 It is beyond
question that certain elements of the white community are guilty
of employing this strategy in the current debate. The following
discussion demonstrates, however, that this example apparently
has a special appeal to the new governing class, which follows it
with alacrity.
B. Nostalgia With Africa
The advent of a new political dispensation in South Africa has
also given birth to a new transformationalist discourse, which has
emerged in defense of a new cultural value system in which Afri-
can people assume the position of the vanguard race. This cultural
value system assumes an overriding function in the affairs of the
nation and rises to the level of a supreme norm by which human
action is judged and declared morally defensible or indefensible.
As seen with the ethnically determined "Volksgeist" the new cul-
tural value system exists in organic harmony with the instruments
8. CITIZEN, June 16, 1994, at 4.
9. Cf. P.J. Visagie & J.L. Pretorius, The Ideological Structure of the Minority Rights
Discourse in South Africa, 8 S. AFR. PUB. L. 53, 57 (1993).
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of power and seeks to colonize all other institutions. It is distinctly
racially aligned. Where this new design is used to transform or re-
structure South African society, the following three principles have
emerged.
1. The composition of even non-state institutions is judged in
accordance with a simple numbers game.
According to the popular post-apartheid slogan, all institu-
tions must reflect the national demographics of the country. Re-
gional peculiarities and other relevant considerations are conse-
quently subsumed under a mathematical calculation.
2. In the education field, an outbreak of cultural frenzy demands
that institutions become Africanized and democratized.
The arguments for such transformation are essentially politi-
cal and not educational; they deal with the introduction of a new
elite culture, representativity, and control of management bod-
ies. 10 Individuals who are familiar with the rhetoric of Christian-
national education under apartheid will immediately recognize the
decisive influence of a specific culturally determined understand-
ing and interpretation that lords over the manifold diversity of in-
terests and aspirations of different communities. Consequently,
transformation and all of its implications are subsumed under a
cultural and racial imperative. The demand for the democratiza-
tion of non-state institutions also displays a lack of understanding
for the inherent differences between the political and non-political
spheres of our existence. 11 Democratic representativity applies
beyond its constitutional limits as the supreme political value for
even the non-political institutions of society. Thus, openings exist
for attempts to make everything subservient to the needs and de-
sires of the leading political movement-a strategy followed by the
nationalist government with devastating consequences.
10. See generally H.A. Strydom, The Unicolor Rainbow Nation, 2 J. FOR JURID. SCI. i
(1996) (dealing with the debate more fully).
11. See HANS KLEIN, DIE GRUNDRECHTE IM DEMOKRATISCHEN STAAT44 (1974).
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3. Critical remarks by whites on government policy and action are
rejected as Eurocentric and racist.
It is suggested that society should conform to a new standard
of conduct guided by a particular group culture of which all insti-
tutions should become the ultimate guardians. Individuals who re-
fuse to submit themselves to the imperatives of the new official
identity become settlers or obstructionists-popular terms for la-
beling others in the new leadership elite's vocabulary.
These attitudes ultimately lead to the alienation and margi-
nalization of groups that do not form part of the dominant culture
and create relationships of domination and subordination-
something that should be quite familiar to the new governing elite.
Where this poses a real or perceived threat to the rights and inter-
ests of communities, the tendency exists to seek protection from a
familiar and enclosed "cultural" environment and to reinforce it
with political mechanisms. This is perhaps the true tragedy of the
present situation in South Africa: the old and the new communi-
cate with the same vocabulary and employ the same strategies.
The symbiosis is nearly perfect.
C. Rediscovery of the Proletarian Paradise
In the 1980s, shortly before Marx was buried for the second
time, a collection of essays, many of which were authored by
prominent ANC members, was published under the title The Na-
tional Question in South Africa.12 As the title hints and the intro-
duction confirms, the publication treated the curious reader to a
Marxist-Leninist analysis of the South African situation. The
main message of this gospel was that liberation must ultimately
aim at a socialist reconstruction of South Africa.
The class earmarked for this messianic task was the black
worker. Through the black worker, we will not only arrive at our
socialist future, but will also experience the deepening of national
unity in economic, political and cultural life necessary for the
achievement of one nation. Nation-building in this sense means a
unification of the working class as the leading class whose culture,
aspirations and economic interests must become increasingly those
12. THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA (Maria Van Diepen ed., 1988).,
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of the majority in South Africa. 13
This eschatological faith in a proletarian future has not lost its
allure for some prominent leaders in the post-apartheid political
industry. Two contributions in a recent edition of The African
Communist by two ANC members of Parliament and leading fig-
ures in the South African Communist Party shed more light on
this.' 4 In both instances, the central theme is how to deal with the
emergence and apparent resilience of ethnic, racial and other
identities in post-apartheid South Africa from a Marxist perspec-
tive on nationalism and national unity or identity. The challenge
according to the authors is to advance the national democratic
revolution beyond its current limited aspirations, democratization,
non-racialism and national self-determination, to a more com-
plete stage which will see the realization of a socialist society and
new South African nation based on the cultures, values and inter-
ests of the African working class.
Once the new nation or national identity becomes imbued
with the hegemonial working class and its economic interests, the
divisions will be obliterated because the working class will tolerate
only the "culture, values and interests of classes and strata outside
this alliance that are reconcilable with it. '' 15 All areas, even volun-
tary associations, are "terrains of contestation which the working
class must occupy. ' ' 16 This "deepened sense of transition" will
even change our understanding of concepts, such as non-racialism,
which will be given a more specific (hegemonial) cultural and class
content. The new bill of rights and constitutional recognition of
diversity apparently must obey this imperative and assume a new
function to help in the construction of a national working class
13. See generally H.A. Strydom, Self-Determination: Its Use and Abuse, 17 S. AFR.
Y.B. INT'L L. 90, 104-08 (1991/92) (discussing this publication in more detail).
14. See Yunus Carrim, The National Question in Post-Apartheid South Africa-
Reconciling Multiple Identities, THE AFR. COMMUNIST, Third Quarter 1996, at 49; Philip
Dexter, Marxism and the National Question in a Democratic South Africa, THE AFR.
COMMUNIST, Third Quarter 1996, at 59.
15. Carrim, supra note 14, at 51.
16. Dexter, supra note 14, at 62-63.
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identity. 17 Thus, it is not surprising to learn from one of the
learned authors that the "particular flavor given to the concept of
nationhood in South Africa as influenced by the notion of recon-
ciliation seems to represent a potential threat to a progressive
definition of a South African identity. 1 8
As in the case of ethno-nationalism and africanization, the in-
troduction of a mass workers culture to bridge certain divides in
favor of a single national identity has two consequences, which
normally operate as flip sides of the same coin. First, it has an ex-
clusionary and alienating effect on certain sectors of society. Sec-
ond, it paves the way for identification of a certain group or class
with the state. Consequently class interests and aspirations be-
come translated into state interests and aspirations. As a result,
any limitation on state power remain wishful thinking. What re-
flects the needs of the hegemonial class at a given time becomes at
once the law of the state.
One possible explanation for these extreme and reactionary
positions is that they assume the function of pastoral homes for
sections of a society in which a common political and legal culture
is still largely absent. They are places of refuge, providing the
sense of belonging, identity and security a common, internalized
political and legal culture would otherwise be capable of provid-
ing.19. As long as the center stage is occupied by forces competing
for hegemonial positions, they will constantly be suspicious that
the institutions of power may fall victim to the whims of pariah
political entrepreneurs who will create centers of patronage and
preferment. The status-degradation and alienation that certain
groups experience in such a fluid environment usually becomes a
powerful force in the formation of communal identities, in which
loyalty to the group supersedes other loyalties.
Important questions thus remain: what position does the new
constitutional order represent in this environment; will it succeed
in establishing the kind of legal basis that will unify on the one
hand and still be sufficiently accommodating towards diverse aspi-
rations on the other; and how real is the threat of the constitu-
tional order falling victim to powerful partisan interests? Some
17. See Carrim, supra note 14, at 55-56.
18. Dexter, supra note 14, at 59.
19. See Adam, supra note 2, at 20-21.
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questions may only find answers through the lapse of time. For
present purposes, prudence dictates concentration on what the
new order offers or fails to offer in the quest for finding unity in
diversity without sacrificing the latter.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF MINORITIES
The multi-party constitutional negotiating process began in
February 1990. The negotiations included two phases, according
to which an interim constitution would first be negotiated and im-
plemented for a transitional period, with drafting of a new consti-
tution undertaken by a democratically elected Constitutional As-
sembly after the first democratic elections in April 1994. The
commitment of the negotiating parties to draft and adopt a new
constitution for the country by a credible and properly mandated
body was clear. This process, however, did not entirely satisfy mi-
nority groups. They feared that such a body might not satisfacto-
rily address their anxieties and foil their participation in designing
a constitutional framework for future governance of the country.
Consequently, thirty-four Constitutional Principles were included
in a Schedule to the Interim Constitution to provide a binding
framework on the Constitutional Assembly for the drafting of the
new Constitution. 20
, As an additional protective measure, the Constitutional Court
subjected the adoption of the final text to its certification and re-
quired that the new text comply with the Constitutional Principles.
This process ended in December 1996, after the Court referred the
text back to the Constitutional Assembly for amendments. The
two constitutional texts, the thirty-four Constitutional Principles
and the judgments of the Constitutional Court are all important in
understanding the new constitutional framework and thinking be-
hind the mechanisms for the protection of minority rights and in-
terests. Hence, it is the main focus of the discussion below.
20. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 71, sched. 4.
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A. Constitutional Principles
Since various aspects of the Constitutional Principles already
found expression in the Interim Constitution, it is appropriate to
start with the Principles and then follow with how they are realized
in the different constitutional texts.
Without being overly technical, one may distinguish between
principles that prohibit non-discrimination on the basis of culture,
language, origin, religion and persuasion, versus principles that
allow for special measures aiming at the preservation of cultural or
other identities on the other. The first category secures equal
treatment and ensures that no one is prevented from exercising
their rights on the basis of a group association that might differ
from the political majority. Constitutional Principles III and IV, as
well as section 8 of the Interim Constitution echo these sentiments
in outlawing unequal treatment or discrimination on a variety of
grounds.
21
Of the second category, Constitutional Principles create dif-
ferent possibilities. First, Constitutional Principle XI makes it in-
cumbent on the Constitution to recognize and protect the diversity
of language and culture, and to encourage conditions for their
promotion. 22 This principle is artfully worded. It does not allow
for an interpretation that is conclusive enough to place a positive
duty on the state to create the conditions necessary for the promo-
tion of different cultures and languages. It only requires that the
state should bestow its blessings on attempts to create favorable
conditions for the promotion of cultural diversity. In this manner,
the public realm relegates cultural concerns to the private sphere,
an issue that will again be addressed later in the discussion.
Second, provisions are made for two forms of self-
determination. One is cultural self-determination. Constitutional
Principle XII provides for this by allowing "collective rights of
self-determination in forming, joining and maintaining organs of
civil society, including linguistic, cultural and religious associations
on the basis of non-discrimination and free association." 23 Consti-
tutional Principle XXXIV, on the other hand, opens the way for
21. See id. § 8 sched. 4, const. princs. III-IV.
22. See id. sched. 4, const. princ. X1.
23. Id. sched. 4, const. princ. XII.
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political self-determination "by any community sharing a common
cultural and language heritage, whether in a territorial entity
within the Republic or in any other recognized way."
24
On the eve of the April 1994 elections, a historic accord was
signed between the ANC, the then South African Government,
and the conservative Freedom Front.25 The immediate conse-
quence of this accord was last minute amendments to the Interim
Constitution, such as Constitutional Principle XXXIV.26 Thus, the
self-determination aspirations of certain communities could re-
main on the political and constitutional agenda. Notably, the par-
ties to the Accord agreed on a concept of self-determination that
was vastly different from what was previously a caricature of the
concept under apartheid rule. This new tone was already present
in a December 1993 Memorandum of Agreement between the
Afrikaner Volksfront, the forerunner of the Freedom Front, and
the ANC. Both parties committed themselves to the development
of a non-racial democracy. 27 The Memorandum, included in the
Accord, also endorsed the "universally accepted" concept of self-
determination "expressed in the Charter of the United Nations
which serves the purpose of peaceful co-operation between peo-
ples on the basis of mutual respect and recognition of fundamental
freedoms and basic human rights for all." 28
By making Charter law the point of reference, the implemen-
tation of Constitutional Principle XXXIV will have to be consid-
ered against the background of international law developments.
Furthermore, section 231(4) of the Interim Constitution and sec-
tion 232 of the 1996 Constitution make customary international
law an integral part of South African law.29 Recently, the South
24. Id. sched. 4, const. princ. XXXIV, 1 1. It is important to read this provision while
considering the historical developments that caused its inclusion in schedule 4 of the In-
terim Constitution.
25. Accord on Afrikaner Self-Determination Between the Freedom Front, the Afri-
can National Congress and the South African Government/National Party, Apr. 23, 1994
[hereinafter Accord on Afrikaner Self-Determination].
26. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) sched. 4, const. princ. XXXIV.
27. See Accord on Afrikaner Self-Determination, supra note 25.
28. Id. at 8, 13-14.
29. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 231(4); S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996)
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African government became a signatory to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).30 This new frame-
work and the developments that have taken place within it over
recent years, open up various possibilities for minority rights pro-
tection.
This remains one of the unresolved issues in South Africa's
constitutional and political development. The other unresolved is-
sue is the accommodation of the aspirations of the traditionalists
among the Zulu nation. During the sensitive negotiations preced-
ing the April 1994 elections, self-determination for the Zulus be-
came a volatile rallying point. Using historic title to ancestral land
and the right of the Zulu Monarchy to have a separate existence,
Zulu nationalism was effectively mobilized. This resulted in cer-
tain last-minute amendments to the draft text of the Interim Con-
stitution in order to accommodate the aspirations of the tradi-
tionalists. Constitutional Principle XIII, for instance, makes it
obligatory that the Constitution provide for the recognition and
.protection of the institution, status and role of traditional leader-
ship in accordance with indigenous law.31 Certain provisions in the
Interim Constitution itself were amended to give effect to these
principles.
B. Interim Constitution
In culturally diverse societies, equal treatment, political par-
ticipation and the preservation of cultural identity are crucial in-
gredients of legal and constitutional mechanisms for the protection
of minorities and form the basis for further development of such
mechanisms. These minimum requirements have become com-
mon knowledge in all the major international instruments on the
subject. 32
1. Equal treatment
Under normal circumstances, equal treatment or non-
§ 232.
30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,6 I.L.M. 368.
31. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) sched. 4, const. princ. XIII.
32. See Report on Equality and Non-Discrimination: Minority Rights, Council of
Europe (90) 6 (1990); H.A. Strydom, Views on the International Measures for the Protec-
tion of Minorities, S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L.. 134, 137 (1992/93).
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discrimination is the least problematic of these requirements. It
becomes problematic when historical circumstances sanction ex-
clusions to the general rule. This is the case with section 8(3) of
the Interim Constitution, which allows for unequal treatment when
measures are taken to advance persons or groups disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination in the past.33 In principle, no objection
should arise to the inclusion of measures which aim at addressing
injustices of the past. The problem arises, however, when no clear
policy guidelines on the implementation of remedial measures ex-
ist. Moreover, when the group singled out for favorable treatment
already stands in the majority and, thus, in a favorable position,
where does it leave minority communities and their legitimate and
equitable entitlements to a share in the spoils of the public realm?
It is no solution to appease them with the opportunities of the pri-
vate sphere.
2. Language and Culture
On the point of special measures for the protection of cultural
diversity, one can refer to several provisions in the Interim Consti-
tution. Section 3 lists eleven languages and classifies all of them as
official languages of the Republic at the national level.34 The sec-
tion also obligates the government to create conditions for their
development and for the promotion of their equal use and enjoy-
ment. In dealings with public administration at the national level,
a person is entitled to use and be addressed in an official language
of his or her choice, when practicable. 35 This provision, in con-
junction with section 31, which forms part of the Bill of Rights in
Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution, and states that "every per-
son shall have the right to use the language and to participate in
the cultural life of his or her choice."' 36 In legal proceedings, a
party to litigation, an accused person or a witness is entitled to use
the official language of their choice and may require that the pro-
33. This is the so-called affirmative action clause, which Parliament re-enacted in the
1996 Constitution. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 9(2).
34. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 3.
35. See id. § 3(6).
36. See id. § 31.
885
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ceedings be interpreted in a language understood by them.37
At the regional (provincial) level, language policy is provided
for by section 3(4) and (5).38 A provincial legislature may, for in-
stance, declare any of the official languages as the official language
of the province. 39 Certain safeguards, however, apply in such in-
stances. Two-thirds of its members must approve the legislature's
resolution, and no language right or status of an official language
existing at the time of the commencement of the Constitution may
be diminished. 40 The purpose of this provision is to protect the
pre-constitutional position of the use of the prior official lan-
guages Afrikaans, English and perhaps also an indigenous lan-
guage in certain areas.
Section 3(9) protects languages and contains a list of princi-
ples, legislation and government policy and practice in regard to
the use of language..41 Included in the list are the following:
1. no language may be used for the purpose of exploitation,
domination or division;
2. multi-lingualism shall be promoted and translation fa-
cilities provided; and
3. respect for languages other than the official languages
must be fostered and their use encouraged.42
Another significant step is the provision in section 3(10) for
the establishment of an independent Pan South African Language
Board.43 This Board, subsequently established by Parliamentary
legislation,44 is empowered by the Interim Constitution to promote
respect for the principles set out in section 3(9), to further the de-
velopment of the official languages, and to promote respect for
other languages used by communities in South Africa. The Board
also has an advisory function with regard to legislation on language
issues.
37. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200"of 1993) § 107. 'See also id. § 25(1)(a), (2)(a), (3)(i)
(dealing specifically with the language rights of detained, arrested and accused persons).
38. See id. § 3(4), (5).
39. See id. § 5.
40. Id.
41. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 3(9).
42. Id.
43. See id. § 3(10).
44. See Pan South African Language Board Act, 1995, 59.
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3. Religion, Belief and Opinion
Section 14 of the Interim Constitution guarantees the right to
freedom of conscience, religious thought, belief and opinion, which
includes academic freedom in institutions of higher learning.
45
The section further allows for some form of derogation from this
general right, which may be significant for minority communities.
In the first instance, state or state-aided institutions may allow for
religious observances. Such observances must take place in accor-
dance with rules established by an appropriate authority. They
must be conducted on an equitable basis and attendance must be
free and voluntary.
This derogation has a particular relevance for state schools.
The section indicates a bias in favor of religious observances at
state schools and demonstrates an unwillingness to adopt the
American approach of strict state neutrality in religious matters.
The requirements of equity and free attendance are concessions to
the libertarians, who expressed disquiet at the inclusion of the
provision. These concessions, however, did not dispel their appre-
hension that, in practice, equity and voluntariness might prove dif-
ficult and even impossible to achieve. 46 Although this might be
true, the solution is sensible and appropriate for a society in which
religion still plays a significant role and the educational system still
struggles to gain respect and legitimacy.
Section 14(3) permits legislation regarding the consequences
of particular religious faiths, at least as far as marriage, personal
and family law are concerned. It creates an opportunity to vali-
date a system of personal and family law, as well as the recognition
of marriages conducted under a system of religious law potentially
different from the official or mainstream practice.47 This section
addresses past injustices resulting from the non-recognition of
marriages conducted in accordance with certain religious beliefs
and practices.
45. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 15 (containing similar provisions).
46. Cf. H. CORDER & L. Du PLESSIS, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S BILL OF
RIGHTS 157 (1994).
47. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 14(3).
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What if practices under a system of religious laws infringe
upon other provisions in the Bill of Rights, such as gender equal-
ity? One must keep in mind that section 35(1) of Chapter 3 on the
Bill of Rights obliges the courts to promote the values of an open
and democratic society based on freedom and equality when inter-
preting the chapter. Section 35(3) makes the interpretation of all
law, including the application and development of the common
law and customary law, subject to the spirit, purport and object of
Chapter 3.48 Additionally, section 33 of the Interim Constitution
contains the limitation provisions.49 It provides that any limitation
on a right entrenched in Chapter 3 shall be permissible only to the
extent that it is reasonable, justifiable in an open and democratic
society, does not negate the essential content of a right, and is also
necessary in certain specified instances. Thus, legislation that rec-
ognizes a system of religious practices, or a law which infringes
upon other rights in Chapter 3, will have to comply with the re-
quirements of section 33.50
4. Education
Education has been and continues to be one of the most con-
tested and politicized issues in South Africa. The social engineer-
ing and experimentation that education was subjected to under
apartheid rule is partly responsible for the intensity of this debate.
In post-apartheid South Africa, education has once again fallen
prey to the manipulating and exploitative strategies of political
opportunists. As a result, educational issues are a highly divisive
influence and are easily instrumentalized in pursuit of cheap politi-
cal gains.
Even under normal circumstances, finding a solution that ef-
fectively caters to culturally diverse needs is fraught with contro-
versies. South Africa, however, suffers under the additional
weight of past disadvantages demanding correction, as well as the
constraints of limited resources and a struggling economy. The
promise of equal access to educational institutions in section 32(a)
of the Interim Constitution, unsupported by adequate financial
48. See id. § 35(3).
49. See id. § 33.
50. See also DION BASSON, SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERIM CONSTITUTION 27 (1994).
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backing51 and educational facilities has left many disillusioned and
frustrated.
The education clause gives little solace to cultural groups as-
piring to find an appreciative environment in state educational in-
stitutions. Their sole consolation is that instruction in the language
of one's choice is guaranteed under section 32(b), so long as it re-
mains reasonably practicable. Education based on a common cul-
ture, language or religion is relegated to private educational insti-
tutions.52 Yet, even this right is subject to the requirement that it
must be practicable to establish such institutions.
Section 32 follows conventional wisdom, emphatically demon-
strated by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in the School
Education Bill case. 53 The case concerns a dispute in the Gauteng
Provincial Legislature concerning the constitutionality of certain
provisions of a bill dealing with language and religious issues in
schools.54 The bill inter alia prohibited language competence
testing as a requirement for admission to a public school and set
certain guidelines for the religious policy of public schools. 55 The
bill also affects private schools supported by government subsidies.
In short, the guidelines aimed at developing respect for South Af-
rica's diverse cultural and religious traditions. They asserted the
right that attendance at religious observances at the schools in
question must be free and voluntary. The bill further empowered
the responsible member of the Provincial Executive Council to di-
rect, after consultation with the governing body of a school, that
the religious policy of a school not complying with the guidelines
be reformulated. 56
A petition by members of the Legislature reserved the matter
to the Constitutional Court to resolve the dispute on the bill's
51. The government introduced a bursary and loan scheme for prospective university
students which has proved to be wholly inadequate.
52. See id. § 32(c).
53. See In re: The School Education Bill, 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
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compliance with section 32 of the Interim Constitution.57 Rele-
vant to the present discussion is the petitioners' contention that
section 32(c) created a positive obligation on the state to establish,
where practicable, schools based on a common culture, language
or religion.58 The Court, in dismissing this somewhat contrived ar-
gument, correctly concluded that the language of section 32(c)
does not support a conclusion that the state carries such an obliga-
tion. The section does, however, provide that "every person shall
have the right to establish such educational institutions. '59 It pro-
vides a defensive right to a person who seeks to establish such edu-
cational institutions and it protects that right from invasion by the
State, without conferring on the State an obligation to establish
such educational institutions. For Judge Sachs, section 32(c) cre-
ated "a constitutionally guaranteed space for private individuals to
set up and maintain their own schools if they feel that their special
cultural, language or religious needs are not being sufficiently ca-
tered for in the State system."'60
As evidenced by the judgment, there are many examples sup-
porting this construction of a state's obligation in culturally diverse
societies. This orthodox wisdom stems essentially from a liberalist
view of the state adopting equality in dignity, rights and entitle-
ments as the hegemonic identity, 61 while relegating peculiar needs
and entitlements to the private sphere. The state's obligation be-
gins and ends with demonstrating a liberal tolerance towards the
collective goals and aspirations of certain cultural communities.
Whether this model is appropriate for a diverse society, such as the
South African one, remains unanswered.
In conclusion, some arguments raised by the Court deserve
further attention because of their underlying assumptions, rather
than their bearing on section 32(c). For instance, the issue of edu-
cational equality and access to educational institutions is prevalent,
either expressly or impliedly throughout the judgment. It there-
57. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 32.
58. See id. § 32(c).
59. In re: The School Education Bill, 1996 (4) BCLR 537,545 (CC).
60. Id. at 572.
61. Cf. id. at 560 (remark of Sachs J ) ("we are further enjoined to interpret the
whole of Chapter 3, including section 32, in a way which promotes the values of an open
and democratic society based on freedom and equality. The theme of diversity has mark-
edly less constitutional pungency.").
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fore becomes crucial to establish how the court understands and
employs equality.
Is equality merely understood as socio-economic equality? In
the judgment, there are several references to "affluent schools and
their defensive postures" or schools that were "well endowed be-
cause of past state support. ' 62 Should this bias indicate an under-
standing of equality as socio-economic equality, the equal treat-
ment of groups in the education clause will always be hermetically
frozen in a meaning dominated by economic considerations. Un-
der such a reductionist scheme the concept of equality is unlikely
to develop the breadth necessary to accommodate non-
economical concerns and aspirations. What has affluence, after
all, to do with the protection of a right?
In his analysis of international law developments in culturally
specific education and its relation to state obligations, Judge Sachs
concluded:
[T]he central theme that runs through the development of in-
ternational human rights law in relation to the protection of
minorities, is that of preventing discrimination against disad-
vantaged and marginalized groups, guaranteeing them full and
factual equality and providing for remedial action to deal with
past discrimination .... The weight of international law ....
should be in favor of the dominated and not the dominating
minorities. 63
By implication, international law does not offer much protec-
tion to the white majority because of their privileged and domi-
nant position in the past. In labeling groups as dominant or non-
dominant, and advantaged or disadvantaged, one detects an eco-
nomic paradigm at work. There exists, however, a more funda-
mental problem with Judge Sach's argument, which relies heavily
upon the dated works of Capotorti on minority rights in interna-
tional law.
In relation to the state, a cultural or ethnic group is neither a
minority nor a majority. As equal partners in rights, all cultural
62. Id. at 560 para. 52, 574-77.
63. Id. at 577.
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groups irrespective of their numerical, linguistic, religious, eco-
nomic or other differences, have rights to equal treatment by the
state in accordance with the demands of justice, of which the state
is essentially an agent. This ideal vanishes once the state is per-
ceived to be the embodiment of a specific societal group.
Thus, from a juridical and state theory perspective, Capo-
torti's categorical statement that dominant minority groups do not
need protection 64 lacks foundation. The republican idea of the
modern state refers to a juridically qualified, communal bond be-
tween citizens and government that transcends all non-juridically
qualified social relations. Thus, the numerical, political, economic
or cultural dominance of one group or another is irrelevant for the
protection of rights. The integration of rights and interests in the
state by public law is inclusive, neither excluding nor favoring a
particular group. After all, that is why the modern state is referred
as a res publica, a public matter. Significantly, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe stated the following in a rec-
ommendation on the rights of minorities:
In a democratic state there can be no second class citizens: citi-
zenship is the same for all .... Within this common citizenship,
however, citizens who share specific characteristics . . . with
others may wish to be granted and guaranteed the possibility of
expressing them.65
Once we link the need for protection to extraneous consid-
erations such as dominance or non-dominance, this equal and
common citizenship ideal is refuted. From a legal rights perspec-
tive, the sole question is whether a group has a right or interest
which inherently qualifies for protection. Nonetheless, the manner
in which the state provides protection for certain groups may of
course differ, despite the principle of equity receiving due recog-
nition.
64. FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONS BELONGING TO
ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 96 (1979).
65. Report on the Rights of Minorities, Eur. Pan. Ass. Deb., 43rd Sess., Doc. No. 6556
(1992).
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5. Political Participation, Legal Intervention
and Provincial Powers
Cultural communities and their members may participate in
the state decision-making process to influence policy and legisla-
tion, which may infringe on their rights through political mecha-
nisms, or they may seek judicial intervention. To illustrate, Consti-
tutional Principle XIV of Schedule 4 to the Interim Constitution
provides for minority group participation in the legislative process
via political parties. The Interim Constitution has given effect to
this process by providing for a government of national unity during
the transition phase. 66 It allocates Cabinet portfolios to parties
holding a certain percentage of seats in the National Assembly67
and supplies a Cabinet decision-making procedure giving consid-
eration to consensus-seeking, rather than resorting to majority
decisions. 68 Similar provisions also exist with regard to provincial
governments. 69 The 1996 Constitution makes it incumbent that
national and provincial legislative bodies provide for participation
by minority parties in their proceedings. 70
The Constitutional Court may intervene in the event of a dis-
pute over the constitutionality of any bill before Parliament or a
Provincial Legislature. In such instances, the Speaker of the Na-
tional Assembly or of a provincial legislature must refer the dis-
pute to the Constitutional Court, upon the request of at least one-
third of the legislative body.71 This effectively suspends the legis-
lative process pending the outcome of the Court's judgment and
creates an opportunity to effect amendments to the bill should it
become necessary. This mechanism has been retained in the 1996
Constitution with only one minor difference. In the case of a re-
66. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) sched. 4, const. princ. XIV.
67. See id. § 88(2).
68. See id. § 89(2).
69. See id. § 149(2), (5).
70. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) §§ 57(2)(b), 70(2)(c), 116(2)(b).
71. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 98(2)(d), (9). This procedure was fol-
lowed in the Education Bill case, supra note 53. See also In re: The National Education
Policy Bill No. 83 of 1995, 1996 (4) BCLR 518 (CC).
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ferral by the provincial legislature, the supporting vote has been
lowered to at least twenty percent of the members.
72
Lastly, cultural communities may be protected through the
constitution-making power granted to the provinces through sec-
tion 160 of the Interim Constitution. This section authorizes
provinces to adopt their own constitutions, provided that their
provisions are consistent with those of the national Constitution.
73
In the 1996 Constitution, this matter is regulated by sections 142
and 143. 74
Since provinces derive their powers from the national Consti-
tution they are bound by its scope. This is illustrated by the cir-
cumscription of functional areas in the national Constitution
within which provinces may exercise legislative competence.
75
This power runs concurrent with that of the national legislature to
legislate on matters falling within the functional areas of the
provinces. In certain instances, national legislation will override
provincial legislation.76 Accordingly, a provincial constitution may
only regulate matters that fall within the functional areas and op-
erate consistently with the national Constitution.77 So far, only the
province of KwaZulu-Natal has embarked on this route, albeit un-
successfully.78
Of the functional areas assigned to provinces, only the follow-
ing may be relevant for the protection of cultural communities:
cultural affairs, education, language policy, traditional authorities
and indigenous law. Because the regulation of these matters by a
province must be certified as consistent with the national Consti-
tution, leeway for the provinces is limited, especially given the ex-
tensive and detailed regulation by the Interim Constitution and its
successor. As the Constitutional Court's rejection of the
72. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) §§ 80, 122.
73. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 160.
74. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) §§ 142, 143.
75. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 126, sched. 6.
76. See id. § 126(2)(A), (3).
77. See id. § 160(4).
78. See Certification of the Constitution of KwaZulu-Natal, CCI" 15/96. The
KwaZulu-Natal provincial constitution did not pass certification by the Constitutional
Court in September 1996 on the grounds that it assumed and assigned powers and func-
tions to the province that fall outside those granted by schedule 6 of the Interim Consti-
tution. The province of the Western Cape is currently involved in the drafting of a pro-
vincial constitution.
[Vol. 19:873894
1997] Minority Rights in Post-Apartheid South Africa 895
KwaZulu-Natal provincial constitution under the Interim Consti-
tution indicates, the drafting problems for provinces are consider-
able.79 The source of this dilemma is found in the drafting history
of the Interim Constitution and in the attempts to find some com-
mon ground between the centralists and the federalists. Through
the incorporation of a maze of conditional clauses, concessions
made during the compromise process eventually eroded the power
of the provinces.
6. Accommodation of Self-Determination and Aspirations
In Part A, this article described how the Constitutional Prin-
ciples were amended to accommodate the aspirations of both con-
servatives and traditionalists. These aspirations also influenced
certain provisions in the Inierim Constitution. As a result both
groups were provided with some constitutional protection, even if
the amendments only succeeded in keeping the debate alive and
prevented their aspirations from being completely overshadowed
by the liberalist tenor of the new South Africa.
To accommodate the traditionalists amongst the Zulu nation,
an option was created to provide for the institution, role, authority
and status of traditional leadership. This also secured the position
of the Zulu Monarch through provincial constitutional mecha-
nisms.80 The status of traditional authorities is continued in sec-
tion 181(1), which provides that, a traditional authority which ob-
serves a system of indigenous law, recognized by law prior to the
Interim Constitution, shall continue as such.81 Traditional leaders
observing a system of indigenous law and residing on land within
the jurisdiction of local government become ex officio members of
a local government and are eligible for election to any such local
government position.82
Traditional leaders are not elected, this arrangement is clearly
a derogation from the principle that "there shall be democratic
79. See id.
80. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 160(3)(b).
81. See id. § 181(1).
82. See id. § 182.
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representation at all levels of government," as proclaimed by Con-
stitutional Principle XVII.83 This Principle specifically, however,
allows for such a derogation in the case of traditional authorities.
In traditional communities, traditional authorities function on the
local government level and usually engage in matters which fall
under local government jurisdiction. These mechanisms allow
traditional leaders to represent traditional interests and aspirations
in local government structures, and then facilitate cooperation be-
tween official local authorities and traditional authorities on mat-
ters of mutual concern.
On the provincial level, the Interim Constitution through
provincial legislation provides for establishment of a Provincial
House of Traditional Leaders. 84 The function of the House is two-
fold: (1) to advise the provincial government regarding matters
relating to traditional authorities, indigenous law, or the traditions
and customs of traditional communities in the province; and (2) to
comment on provincial bills pertaining to traditional authorities,
indigenous law, traditions and customs before they are enacted
into law. On the national level the Interim Constitution estab-
lishes a provision for the creation of a Council of Traditional
Leaders to address national matters pertaining to traditional
authorities. 85 It is clear that on the provincial and national levels
the representation of traditional authorities is limited to advisory
powers.
For conservatives, the process created an opportunity to pur-
sue their aspirations for constitutional self-determination. Unlike
the case of Zulu self-determination, which is more culturally in-
clined, the white conservative groups envisaged a territorially de-
marcated entity within which some form of political autonomy, if
not independence, could be attained as the culmination of their
self-determination aspirations. This long-term goal did not pre-
clude other options or intermediate steps, and the last-minute
amendments to the Interim Constitution served as a forum for de-
bate, research and feasibility studies on the various possibilities.
The term "Volkstaat Council" which was chosen for this fo-
83. See id. const. princ. XVII.
84. See id. § 183.
85. See id. § 184.
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rum86 already incorporates the notion of an independent state and
reflects the ultimate aspirations of at least certain elements in con-
servative politics. The powers and functions of the Council are
advisory in nature and it purports to "gather, process and make
available information with regard to possible boundaries, powers
and functions and legislative, executive and other structures of
such a Volkstaat, its suggested relationship with government at
national and provincial level, and any other relevant matter.
' '87
Thus, the Council must make recommendations to government on
the implementation and different forms of self-determination
considered by the Council. The Council, inaugurated in June 1994,
has yet to develop concrete proposals and its future under the 1996
Constitution is uncertain.
As illustrated, both groups have struggled for the realization
of their aspirations in an unfayorable and unstable environment.
South African politics might be free from the constraints of the
past, but it has yet to move beyond its reactionary phase. Conse-
quently, those who do not want to pronounce the post-apartheid
virtuous shibboleth are suspiciously and begrudgingly met with
concessions, and run the risk of becoming entangled in a political
game of either marginalization or co-option. Internal dissent
among the protagonists of self-determination, in either form, fur-
ther adds to the absence of consolidated positions and claims, and
creates fertile opportunity for exploitation by rival forces by ma-
nipulating the discourse.
C. The 1996 Constitution
On February 4, 1997, South Africa's final or new Constitution,
as it is commonly referred to, came into effect. This Constitution
marks the culmination of the country's move towards a constitu-
tional dispensation that could provide the foundation "for a demo-
cratic and open society in which government is based on the will of
86. See id. § 184(A). This section and the one following constitute a new chapter,
Chapter I1A of the Interim Constitution, and was inserted by section 9 of Act 2 of 1994.
87. See id. § 184(1)(a).
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the people and every citizen is equally protected by the law." 88
1. Language and Culture
The provision on the status of languages 89 does not alphabeti-
cally order the eleven official languages as in the Interim Consti-
tution. Instead, the languages are listed according to usage, start-
ing with the language lowest on the numerical ladder. The
purpose of the structure is to change the order preference in a de-
liberate attempt to give textual prominence to languages lacking
widespread usage.
Two other notable changes were effected by the new provi-
sion. The Interim Constitution embodied the outspoken philoso-
phy that all eleven languages listed in section 3 of the Constitution
should enjoy the status of official language at the national level. 90
It also urged the government to create conditions for their equal
use and enjoyment. This aspiration is somewhat compromised in
the new Constitution in various ways.
First, indigenous languages are singled out by the state for
"advancement and status elevation" by reason of their historically
diminished use and status.91 This implies a different approach
than advocating "equal use and enjoyment." Second, according to
the new Constitution, instead of "equal use and enjoyment," all
official languages must enjoy "parity of esteem and must be
treated equitably," subject to the state's obligation with regard to
indigenous languages. 92 Third, the choice of official language by
different levels of government is now subject to a variety of con-
siderations not mentioned in the Interim Constitution, such as us-
age, practicality, expense, regional circumstances, and the balance
of the needs and preferences of the population.93 The changes in
the new Constitution are probably the result of a more sober as-
sessment of the financial and practical implications of the Interim
88. S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) pmbl. This is certainly not the occasion for an
extensive analysis of the differences between the Interim Constitution and the new Con-
stitution. Many differences between the two are merely variations in semantics and tex-
tual construction. Thus, the discussion is limited to more substantial differences.
89. See id. § 6(1).
90. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 3.
91. See id. §6(2).
92. See id. §6(4).
93. See id. §6(3).
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Constitution's post-apartheid language policy, which was some-
what of an over-reaction against the marginalization of indigenous
languages under apartheid.
The new language provision contains no reference to the
principles listed in section 3(9) of the Interim Constitution, which
had the purpose of guiding government legislation and policy re-
garding the use of the official languages. While one or two of
those principles might have become obsolete in light of the new
approach to the use of official languages, others, like the ones
mentioned above in the discussion of the Interim Constitution, can
hardly be devoid of any significance for the future development of
a South African language policy.
The provision on the Pan South African Language Board has
been amended to include a specific reference to the Khoi, Nama
and San languages, as well as sign language, in the list of languages
the Board is called upon to promote and develop.94
With regard to culture, the Bill of Rights contains a new sec-
tion on cultural, religious and linguistic communities95 influenced
by article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. The relevant portion reads as follows:
31 (1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic
community may not be denied the right with other members of
that community
(a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their
language; and to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and
linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a man-
ner inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.96
The first part of this provision has the individualistic ring of
article 27 and, like the latter, will probably be the subject-matter
94. See id. § 6(5). The other languages falling into this category are German, Greek,
Gujerati, Hindi, Portuguese, Tamil, Telegu, Urdu, Arabic, Hebrew, Sanskrit, and other
languages used for religious purposes.
95. See id. at ch. I1, § 31. The Bill of Rights is contained in Chapter 2 of the 1996
Constitution.
96. Id.
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of endless debates on whether the rights contained in the section
are conferred on individuals or groups. For present purposes,
there is no sense in attempting even a few passing remarks with re-
gard to that debate. Two other matters, though, deserve further
attention.
The first one relates to the provision in section 31(1)(b)
which, inter alia, establishes a right to maintain cultural, religious
and linguistic associations. This raises some interesting questions.
First, will an association be entitled to limit or even exclude certain
categories of persons based on an argument that such steps are vi-
tal to maintaining that particular association? Additionally, will it
be regarded as fair discrimination and thus not outlawed by section
9, which contains the equal treatment clause? This is particularly
relevant since the new Constitution, unlike the Interim Constitu-
tion, may also directly apply to relationships between individuals
on what is popularly called the horizontal level.97 Secondly, will
such a practice of limiting or excluding potential members pass the
consistency test set by section 31(2)? Moreover, is it unrealistic to
envisage the operation of private educational institutions under
similar conditions and on the premise that the cultural ethos of an
educational institution forms a crucial element in the conservation
and transfer of the cultural life of a community?
I raise these questions because an aspect of the debate on pro-
tection of institutions for cultural communities that is normally an
anathema to the individualist approach to human rights protection
has been largely ignored. Namely, may an institution claim consti-
tutional protection for its cultural ethos or underlying value sys-
tem? If so, can it exclude or limit, on that basis, certain categories
of persons from membership or expect prospective members to re-
spect and abide by the value system underscoring the cultural
ethos of that institution?' These are familiar issues in the current
wide-spread debate on criticism of the orthodox liberal approach
to such concerns, and in the course of further discussion they will
be raised again.
The second matter concerns the provision on the Commission
for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Relig-
97. See id. § 8(2).
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ious and Linguistic Communities.98 This provision forms part of
Chapter 9 which regulates "State Institutions Supporting Consti-
tutional Democracy" and includes provisions on institutions such
as the Public Protector, the Gender Commission, and the Human
Rights Commission. It was a concession to minority parties to
break an impasse in the negotiations hours before the deadline for
the drafting of the new Constitution was to expire. Its aim is to
provide a forum for expressing the concerns and aspirations of cul-
tural and other communities.
The primary functions entrusted to the Commission are:
1. to promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious
and linguistic communities;
2. to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity,
tolerance and national unity among the different commu-
nities on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and free
association; and
3. to recommend the establishment or recognition of a
cultural or other council or councils for a community or
communities in South Africa.
The Commission, which must be broadly representative of the
main cultural, religious and linguistic communities in South Af-
rica, 99 is empowered to monitor, investigate, research, educate,
lobby, advise and report on issues concerning the rights of the re-
spective communities. 100 Like the other Chapter 9 institutions, the
Commission is instructed to be independent, subject only to the
Constitution and the law, to act impartially and to perform its
functions without fear, favor or prejudice. 101 The Commission is
accountable to the National Assembly and must report on its ac-
tivities at least once a year.102
In September 1996, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative
for South Africa (IDASA) hosted a conference in Cape Town on
98. See id. at ch. IX, § 185.
99. See id. § 186(2).
100. See id. at ch. IX, § 185(2).
101. See id. § 181(2).
102. See id. § 181(5).
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matters relating to the Commission. On this occasion, prominent
ANC members of Parliament aired their views on the political im-
peratives behind the creation of the Commission and on what they
perceived to be the intended aim and function of the Commis-
sion.103 From their observations, one may arrive at an understand-
ing of the rationale behind such a mechanism and how this ration-
ale may impact on future developments.
In his contribution the Minister of Constitutional Affairs ex-
plained that the "drafters of the new constitutional text have ac-
knowledged the fact that the transition process to a full democratic
system in South Africa is to a great extent dependent on the skill-
ful management of historically founded perceptions regarding dif-
ferent communities. ' 10 4 While non-racialism is the "core ideology
of the new South African state," the challenge is "to demonstrate
that within a culture of non-racialism, various cultural, religious
and linguistic communities can prosper and jointly provide con-
tent" to the new South African society. 105 Underlying the estab-
lishment of the Commission is the "objective of nation building"
and in this process "respect for the rights of cultural, religious and
linguistic communities must be ensured, and peace, friendship,
humanity, tolerance and national unity amongst the different
communities must be promoted and developed."'1 06
Regarding other contributions, three issues deserve attention.
First, the creation of a national identity, a challenge in the transi-
tional phase, to "imply a sense of political community, some com-
mon institutions, and a single code of rights and duties for all
members of the community. ' 107 Second, this end must be borne in
mind by the Commission who must not allow an "unbridled ex-
pression of separatist cultural diversity that will corrode a growing
sense of South Africanness. 108 Third, it was decided that the time
103. See Valli Moosa, Minister of Const. Aff., Legislation and the Anticipated Political
Process (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); Kader Asmal, Minister of Wa-
ter Affairs, Constitutional Background and Political Imperatives Surrounding the Com-
mission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Lin-
guistic Communities (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
104. Moosa, supra note 103.
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id. at 3.
107. See Asmal, supra note 103, at 3.
108. Id. at 6.
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had come to move away from the denouncement of group rights
and to "understand from a progressive position that there are cer-
tain rights which can only be exercised as group or collective
rights. For the effective protection of cultural, linguistic and relig-
ious rights, they can only be exercised by individuals as part of a
collective.' 109  This latter assumption was explained as a
"paradigm shift" and a necessary part of the recognition of the
reality of a divided country in which a number of cultural, linguis-
tic or religious groups feel threatened by a perceived homogenous
majority. 1 0 Consequently, the "creation of the Commission is an
attempt to deal with the issue of minority rights creatively."'
These sentiments, all appropriate for the issue under discus-
sion, have a familiar ring. In the 1980s, the former South African
government mandated the South African Law Commission to
conduct research into and compile a report on the introduction of
a Bill of Rights for South Africa. This report was known as Project
25: Group and Human Rights, and was published in March 1989.
Subsequently, the Law Commission published a lengthy Interim
Report and a summary of the latter, containing the most important
conclusions and recommendations of the Law Commission on the
issue of group and human rights. The following extracts are made
from the summary report:
The Law Commission is of the opinion that a sympathetic
vision of a future South Africa amongst all South Africans
is only possible if all needs are identified and given effect
to in a practical, non-dogmatic manner. An attempt must
be made to create mechanisms for the protection of rights,
even if it would mean that new remedies and new mecha-
nisms must be discovered;
There are still many South Africans who sought protec-
tion for their rights in what is interchangeably referred to
as group rights, minority rights or community rights. This
is understandable in view of the deep divisions in society
as a result of the policy of apartheid and the concomitant
109. Id. at 7.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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feelings of suspicion and distrust. The basic question is
whether South Africans are really one nation, or just a-
multiplicity of nations that occupy the same territory, held
together by a loose and competitive relationship;
From the reaction received on Project 25 and from observ-
ing daily affairs in our country, it is clear that group con-
flict will not be solved by ignoring the existence of groups
and the conflict between them. The answer is not forced
assimilation, but a balanced accommodation within a real
and just democracy. 11
2
These episodes in the evolving South African constitutional
debate demonstrate a convergence of formerly disparate views to a
point where constitutional recognition of unity in diversity offers
the best practical solution for this intermediate phase in the coun-
try's political and constitutional development. To push the matter
further would be to bring the delicate balance accomplished after
years of arduous negotiations under tremendous strain. Equally
important, however, will be the realization and further develop-
ment of the constitutional principles through state policy and
practice which, if wrongly conceived and applied, can seriously un-
dermine trust in the existing scheme of constitutional protection.
2. Education
The new provision on education 1 3 contains a further contro-
versial concession to accommodate the concerns of certain com-
munities with regard to the language of instruction. In order to
ensure effective implementation of the right to receive instruction
in the language of one's choice, the state may now consider "all
reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium insti-
tutions, subject to considerations of equity, practicability and the
need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and
practices." 114  In its certification judgment, the Constitutional
Court interpreted this provision as placing a positive duty on the
state to implement language rights with regard to instruction in
educational institutions, which the Court found did not exist under
112. Summary of Interim Report on Group and Human Rights (S. Afr. Law Commis-
sion), Project 58, Aug. 1991, at 16, 25-26. References are to the Afrikaans text. The ex-
tracts in the text above are free translations in summary form of the Afrikaans wording.
113. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 29.
114. See id. § 29(2).
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the Interim Constitution.
115
Single medium schools are now an option, but one that must
be weighed against other possibilities. Discrimination in educa-
tional institutions on linguistic grounds is also allowed by article 2
of the 1960 UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Edu-
cation. 116 In the South African context, demographics and popu-
lation shifts will have a significant influence on the implementation
of the new constitutional principles, and a policy of differential ac-
commodation of different communities is not without merit. The
complexity of the situation is illustrated by the major changes.
schools in rural locations have undergone since the demise of
apartheid. In many instances, all-white schools changed overnight
into all-black schools, forcing white parents to either set up alter-
native schools or send their children to urban areas to be accom-
modated in either mixed or predominantly white educ~tional insti-
tutions. This in turn has led to a numerical overload at some
institutions, and quite often in areas where the teacher/pupil ratio
is already unhealthy. In the final analysis, putting the educational
record straight in the South African context entails much more
than remedying past injustices-the system is in need of a compre-
hensive overhaul.
3. Fate of Self-determination Under the 1996 Constitution
Under the 1996 Constitution the role of traditional leadership
and all its relics in matters of governance will depend on the mercy
of the national, provincial and local legislative authorities. These
authorities no longer have any constitutional obligation 117 to es-
tablish advisory bodies on traditional matters or accommodate
traditional leaders in local government structures, as under the In-
terim Constitution.
The 1996 Constitution continues to recognize the role of tra-
ditional leadership according to customary law, subject to the Con-
115. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 23/96 52;
see also In re: The School Education Bill, 1996 (4) BCLR 537, 572-73 (CC).
116. Adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on December 14, 1960,
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, art. 2 (1990).
117. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 212.
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stitution. Furthermore, the Constitution requires courts to apply
customary law where applicable, as long as it is not inconsistent
with the Constitution or other legislation that deals with customary
law. 118 The Constitutional Court decided that these new provi-
sions adequately comply with Constitutional Principle XIII. 119
Whether these provisions offer less protection than the Interim
Constitution is a matter falling outside the Court's certification
mandate.
Under the new constitutional dispensation, the fate of tradi-
tional systems of authorities and governance is sealed. These sys-
tems will either be gradually phased out or become cultural theme
parks. The underlying reason for this state of affairs transcends
the current constitutional position. Ultimately, it is connected with
modern progress from undifferentiated or closed systems to differ-
entiated or open systems. The modern constitutional state cannot
tolerate alternative systems of governance. Liberalism's homoge-
nizing of the legal order excludes the accommodation of altelrna-
tive, incommensurable legal systems on the state's territory. The
Constitution has made a choice: customary traditions and law
must adapt to the Constitution or die. 120
The regulation of cultural affairs and traditions seems to be
the only role left to traditional authorities. Success in maintaining
their current local government-like functions in rural areas is
doubtful. The present mood is against non-elected officials and
local government is one of the most contested areas in South Afri-
can politics. Local governments are the entities closest to those
individuals who control both the land and resources, through local
government institutions in rural South Africa. In rural South Af-
rica, those who control the land and the resources control the vot-
ers. This control is the underlying cause of the fierce battles over
local government control between the ANC and the Zulu-
dominated Inkatha Freedom Party in the province of KwaZulu-
Natal. 121 These battles have left many dead and countless more
118. See id. § 211.
119. See discussion infra Part 111.B.
120. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 39(2), (3). Section 35(3) is the Interim
Constitution's equivalent provision. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 200 of 1993) § 35(3).
121. For a more detailed discussion of these issues see G. Houston & S. Fikeni, Consti-
tutional Development and the Issue of Traditional Leadership in Rural Local Government
in South Africa Seminar Report: Aspects of the Debate on the Draft of the New South
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homeless.
122
On the white conservative front, the self-determination op-
tion in Constitutional Principle XXXIV has almost identical terms
in the 1996 Constitution. 123 The importance accorded to this
"notion," as the constitutional text refers to it, is clear from its po-
sition in the new Constitution: it falls under the sub-heading
"other matters" in a chapter entitled "General Provisions." Coin-
cidentally, this is where international law is located in both the In-
terim and 1996 Constitutions. During the negotiations all attempts
to have self-determination included in the Bill of Rights, as a third
generation right in accordance with international law, were unsuc-
cessful. Fortunately for the conservatives, their Volkstaat Council
has been given new life under the 1996 Constitution, but only until
Parliament changes its mind.
124
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE OPTIONS
Post-apartheid South Africa chose a constitutional model that
is classically liberal. In keeping with modern trends and to ac-
commodate the peculiar aspirations of certain communities, this
model has been adjusted in two ways. First, constitutional space
has been created for cultural, linguistic and religious communities
to pursue certaifi goals without state interference. Second, the
Constitution has not foreclosed the possibility of territorial self-
determination for conservative groupings. This privatization of
cultural affairs has certain benefits: it absolves the state from its
responsibility to positively contribute to the realization of commu-
nal aspirations, and allows the state to uphold the image of a neu-
tral public institution. What counts, nevertheless, for the liberal
state are the rights and interests of the self-centered individual,
not groups or affiliations.
African Constitution, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 63 (Apr. 1996).
122. Importantly, the Inkatha Freedom Party chose not to participate in the proceed-
ings of the Constitutional Assembly and hence in the drafting of the new Constitution.
Some of the party's representatives in the provincial executive also indicated their refusal
to swear allegiance to the new Constitution See SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997 at 2.
123. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 235.
124. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) sched. 6, § 20(5).
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In recent yearg, the liberal tradition has met with mounting
pressure from feminists, cultural and ethnic minorities and critics
of Eurocentrism. These groups want the modern constitutional
state to recognize the special needs and interests of collective
identities. Specifically, a mere tolerance of diverse identities and
their accommodation in a constitutionally protected space is not
enough. The state must demonstrate that it actually recognizes
these identities for what-they are, and in that process, abandon its
neutral position to promote groups which give shape and meaning
to the lives of their members. The arguments in favor of such an
adjustment to the function of the liberal state have been elo-
quently put by many scholars over the last decade or more. Be-
cause some of my concluding suggestions are related to these sen-
timents, which are of particular relevance for the South African
situation, I will refer to some of the contributions in this regard,
albeit very briefly.
In his seminal work on the politics of recognition, Charles
Taylor argues that the neutrality of the liberal state must be re-
considered in matters regarding collective goals. Providing space
for cultural communities to pursue their own interests is not
enough, rather, public policy should actively secure the future of
cultural communities. This policy might even justify the revoca-
tion or restriction of certain privileges and immunities. 125
Taylor's kindred spirit, Michael Walzer, has made similar
claims. Walzer warns that the real risk of the liberal free-rider
society is that group dissolution and abandonment is inversely re-
lated to state intervention, to compensate for the failures of civil
associations, ultimately threatening the stability of the central state
itself. For "the more dissociated individuals are, the stronger the
state is likely to be, since it will be the only or the most important
social union. '126 According to Walzer, a correction of this out-
come lies in a view of the state which is essentially liberal but pre-
pared to give up its neutrality and endorse or sponsor activities
that form and give shape to collective identities.
More recently, this debate was further enriched by the well-
125. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 17 passim (1989). See generally
CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (1992).
126. Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism 18/1 POL. THEORY
16,17 (1990).
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known German sociologist, Jirgen Habermas. 127  Habermas's
premise is that the correct view of the system of rights in the lib-
eral tradition does not ignore unequal social conditions or cultural
differences, thus, eliminating the need for an alternative model to
correct the individualistic design of the liberal state. Instead, the
correction can be made through a consistent actualization of the
system of rights in life contexts in which the individual's identity is
shaped. 128 What Habermas envisions is a connection between the
universalization of equal treatment of all identities and a differen-
tiation of the legal system, in accordance with a democratic actu-
alization of the system of rights, that will cater to the life contexts
in which citizens safeguard their identities.129 Such a dialogue will
enable critics to clarify what they want to perpetuate and what
they want to stop.
The constitutional framework Habermas envisions is based on
the premise that the state must first provide an open communica-
tion structure and freedom of association. This will allow different
cultural forms of life to advance reasons for their support and pro-
tection, and to formulate legal claims. Second, the constitutional
state can only tolerate claims that are based on the acceptance of a
common political culture, a common horizon of interpretation.
This requires a mutual recognition of the existence of equal, but
different cultural identities with different conceptions of the good.
It also recognizes an "ethical integration of groups and subcultures
with their own collective identities . . . uncoupled from their ab-
stract political integration that includes all citizens equally. ' 130
Here, Habermas distinguishes between two forms of integration.
On the sub-political level, as he calls it, the legal system must
maintain its neutrality, vis-d-vis different cultural communities
and sharpen its sensitivity to the diversity and equal integrity of
127. Jurgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional
State in MULTICULTURALISM 107 (A. Gutmann ed., 1994).
128. See id. at 113.
129. By democratic, I mean that the affected groups must participate in the public de-
bate on the appropriate interpretation of needs and on what is relevant to equal or une-
qual treatment in specific cases. See id. at 115-16.
130. Id. at 133-34.
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the different life forms. Concurrently at the political level, citizens
are integrated into a common political culture on the basis of equal
citizenship. Most important, however, is his observation that the
distinction between the two levels of integration must be main-
tained. "[I]f they are collapsed into one another, the majority cul-
ture will usurp state prerogatives at the expense of the equal rights
of other cultural forms of life and violate their claim to mutual
recognition. '" 131 This is exactly the danger of the manipulation of
the state and its institutions by partisan pressures discussed above.
The issues raised in these debates are pertinent to the South
African situation for various reasons. First, the concept of govern-
ance in the general interest has never taken root as a fundamental
characteristic of the modern state in South Africa. In the past, the
state and its institutions served partisan interests at the expense of
a disenfranchised majority. In post-apartheid South Africa, the
state has assumed a partisan role in the interest of that same ma-
jority at the exclusion of other groups. As in the past, race is a fi-
nancial asset that people do not freely and voluntarily waive. We
need only to recall that it has taken a massive internal revolt and
an unprecedented international sanction campaign to bring down
the system that entrenched white minority rule in South Africa.
When the entrenchment of interests has the additional backing of
the Constitution, 132 it becomes even more difficult to eliminate.
This constitutional backing also hardens perceptions that the state
does not belong to all, that it is not a res publica, but rather an in-
strument serving the interests of a specific group.
I am not questioning the historical imperatives justifying the
current policy to advance formerly downtrodden rights and inter-
ests, merely noting the inevitability that certain groups will feel
excluded and alienated by a partisan state. Indeed, government
and other practices often enhance and confirm existing feelings of
estrangement. Recently, a seasoned foreign correspondent illus-
trated this point by aptly describing the current affirmative action
practice in South Africa as follows:
The American term "affirmative action" is used in public
discourse about "bringing the blacks along," but what is
really happening is the wholesale africanisation of busi-
131. Id. at 134-35.
132. See S. AFR. CONST. (Act 108 of 1996) § 9(2).
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ness and government. The civil service has become the
arena in which ANC loyalists are rewarded for services to
the struggle. Obscure figures from the anti-apartheid
movement have been catapulted into senior jobs for which
they are unqualified. Big corporations, meanwhile, are
finding that the assiduous pursuit of positive discrimina-
tion is the best way to curry favor with the government.
Whites are becoming demoralised because they know that
they will never be promoted.
133
Bloody conflicts between the police and colored communities
around Johannesburg during the first week of February 1997
graphically illustrated the resentment of current government poli-
cies. 34 The cause of the conflict stems from the government pol-
icy to scrap millions in arrear service payments in black areas135
coupled with a general feeling that the colored community has
been marginalized by a government that caters only to black inter-
ests.
The remarks of persons interviewed in the enraged commu-
nity are telling. One spoke of "a failing to embrace coloreds with
the same empathy that saw service arrears in black townships be-
ing scrapped," another bemoaned the fact that "our people have
no choice but to believe that they are a marginalized minority,"
and another still, that the "black government is squeezing every
drop out of us so that we can subsidize the (black) squatters who
are slowly infiltrating our neighborhoods." Just days before this
event, a resident won a High Court suit against the Pretoria City
Council136 on the basis that the Council unfairly discriminated
against mainly white ratepayers by having two systems of rates' as-
sessment: a so-called flat rate in black areas and meter-assessed
133. Stephen Robinson, The Ruination Theory Returning to South Africa, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2281245.
134. See SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 4.
135. In the eighties, the liberation movement embarked on a campaign for non-
payment of services with a view to bring down white controlled local government struc-
tures. After winning the elections, the movement discovered that to turn the tide of non-
payment was not going to be easy. In fact, most attempts have been dismal failures. The
ranks of the non-payers are swelling, and individuals in other communities have sus-
pended their dues in protest.
136. Walker v. Pretoria City Council, A1516/96.
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rates in other areas. Furthermore, the Council used the income
from the metered areas to subsidize other areas.
Second, the common horizon of interpretation or common
political culture Habermas spoke about, is largely absent in South
Africa. Politicians are quick to refer to the Constitution, its insti-
tutions and catalogue of rights to hail the new-found common
value system and national identity in post-apartheid South Africa.
Unfortunately, reality is much more complex. Since the new con-
stitutional dispensation took effect, the government has imposed a
value system on citizens which is inconsistent with their own. This
is largely because government opinion leaders have drawn advisors
from a narrow circle of like-minded "experts" with a strong indi-
vidual rights bias.
In the area of social values, opinion polls have shown that the
beliefs, preferences and values of politically powerful elite groups
do not coincide with important elements in the attitudinal and
value systems of members of the public and often of parties' own
supporters. Three examples illustrate this point. 137 The Constitu-
tional Court abolished the death penalty under the Interim Consti-
tution in 1994.138 Despite being hailed as a landmark judgment it
was subsequently established that no less than 70% of the public
still support the death penalty. The greater irony, however, is that
65.3% of ANC's own supporters also support the death penalty,
while support for the death penalty among members of other par-
ties is even higher. The second example deals with the legalization
of abortion on demand in 1997.139 With the exception of the
Democratic Party supporters, who favor legalized abortion by a
small majority (48.6%), the distribution of those not in favor is as
follows: ANC (78.7%), National Party (73.7%), Inkatha Freedom
Party (74.6%) and the Freedom Front (75.2%). Third, on pornog-
raphy, the distribution among non-supporters is as follows: ANC
(74.9%), National Party (80.5%), Democratic Party (67.5%),
Inkatha Freedom Party (68.4%) and the Freedom Front (90.5%).
The compiler of the survey reached the following self-evident
137. See H. Kotzd, The Working Draft of South Africa's 1996 Constitution; Elite and
Public Attitudes to the Options, KONRAD ADENAUER FOUND, OCCASIONAL PAPERS
(1996).
138. See S. v. Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (SA).
139. Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996.
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conclusions:
This relatively "conservative" public opinion on contem-
porary social issues is clearly not in line with the more
"liberal" thinking of the majority party, the ANC. In this
case the views adopted by the government, not only on
these specific sections of the Working Draft, but also in
legislation, can clearly become out of step with the pre-
vailing values of society.
Where government sets policy according to values vastly dif-
ferent from the values of the community, feelings of estrangement
and distrust are bound to occur. These feelings raise the expecta-
tion that the state, if it wants to demonstrate an all-inclusive legal
bond commensurate with the diverse needs and aspirations of so-
ciety, will have to do more than adopt a laissez-faire policy of lib-
eral tolerance. Creating constitutional space, within which certain
communities may pursue self-chosen ends, is simply not good
enough in a society where there is real danger that partisan inter-
ests will dominate and relationships of trust and confidence are al-
ready in a state of disrepair. 140 A laissez-faire policy in such cir-
cumstances may even confirm suspicions that public institutions
are dumping legitimate concerns in constitutionally created "own
areas" so that the state can pursue its partisan policies unhindered.
A detailed discussion of the mechanisms available to the state
to meet these objections falls outside the scope of this Article.
Note, however, that in recent times an international debate has
evolved regarding the subject of minority rights protection and
self-determination. In that discussion, progress has been made on'
the steps governments may take to accommodate the diversity of
interests in their respective societies. 141 In the South African con-
140. Here, one should not lose sight of public frustration with the administration of
justice' and the threats to personal security from an out-of-control crime wave in the
country.
141. Cf ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES (1995); PEOPLES
AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (C. BrOlmann, R. Lefeber and M. Zieck eds.,
1993); MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION (C. Tomuschat ed., 1993); K. Hailbron-
ner, The Legal Status of Population Groups in a Multinational State under Public Interna-
tional Law, Isr. Y.B on Hum. Rts 127 (1991); G.J. Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty:
Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age, 32 STAN. J. OF INT'L. L 255 (1996).
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text, there are at least two imperatives that should determine state
policy on this issue whatever solution one considers. First, differ-
ential accommodation of groups has a much better chance of suc-
cess than a uniform one. Second, the mechanism must aim at re-
storing the group's lost sense of belonging to a common body
politic and must demonstrate respect for differential qualities and
identities.
